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Current Ethical Problems in
Estate Planning (with Checklist)
by Randall W. Roth
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") unless otherwise
indicated. "ABA" refers to the American Bar Association; "AICPA," to the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; "ACTEC," to the American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel; "ACTEC Commentaries," to ACTEC
Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (3d ed. 1999); and "MRPC,"
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
A. Introduction
1. Estate planners sometimes have a dangerous misconception.
a. Many otherwise competent estate planners just don't "get it" when it
comes to ethics, at least not completely.
i. They think being ethical boils down to the golden rule (i.e., always
treat others as you would like to be treated).
ii. They think of themselves as honest and caring people whose values
and instincts will keep them on the ethical path.
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iii. When confronted with a hypothetical that presents an ethical dilem-
ma, their first (and sometimes last) instinct is to think about how an hon-
est and caring lawyer would logically and caringly deal with that particu-
lar predicament (i.e., do what their gut tells them is "the right thing").
iv. In short, they think of ethics as another name for morality, common
decency, and wisdom.
b. Of course there is some validity to this thinking, and I would never sug-
gest that anyone not try to be moral, decent, and wise. But this way of
thinking about ethics can be terribly inhibiting. See John R. Price, Ethics in
Action Not Ethics Inaction: The ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 29 Inst. on Est. Plan., Ch. 7 (1995).
2. What do we mean by ethics?
a. As used in this outline, ethics refers to a complex set of rules that regulate
the practice of law.
b. Think of these rules the way you might think of the IRC (i.e., intended to
make sense and serve society, but sometimes poorly conceived or poorly
drafted).
c. Also keep in mind that these rules were not written with an estate plan-
ning practice in mind.
i. "[The] Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)... [are] com-
posed largely of general, litigation-based rules that do not address many
of the difficult problems that arise in specific areas of practice. Rather than
recognize the need to consider ways in which the MRPC might be adapt-
ed to meet the needs of lawyers in specific practice areas, the American Bar
Association appears to insist that one rule fits all-without regard to any
differences in the nature of a client and the type of representation provid-
ed." John R. Price, J. Michael Farley & Bruce S. Ross, ACTEC Commentaries
p. 7. The ABA's thinking is illustrated by ABA Formal Opinion 94-380
(1994), which holds that Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) prohibits
lawyers from disclosing fraudulent or criminal conduct on the part of any
client, even when the client is a fiduciary. According to 94-380, Rule 1.6
overrides the other duties of the lawyer: "The client's status [as fiduciary]
is irrelevant."
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ii. "...model ethics rules do little to instruct the [estate] planner: they
assume the existence of either an active transaction between two parties or
litigation between two parties. They also assume that the identity and
interests of each client are clear. In most cases they fail to serve the [estate]
planner." Hilker, 37th Annual Seattle Estate Planning Seminar, Chapter 1A
(1992) ("Hilker").
iii. So if ethics rules don't always instruct estate planners, where do we
go for guidance? "In large measure the duties of trusts and estates lawyers
are defined in many states by opinions rendered in malpractice actions,
which provide incomplete and insufficient guidance regarding the ethical
duties of lawyers." ACTEC Commentaries, supra. "a lawyer is also guided by
personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers." Preamble to ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 6 (1983).
3. What are the possible reasons for the Rules?
a. An economic argument can be made that in the long run adherence to eth-
ical standards will maximize profits. Compare Gerald P. Johnston, An
Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad
Ethics?, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 57 (1984).
b. Case law recognizes that ethics rules are meant to instill public confidence.
See, e.g., Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), Hilker,
supra, p. 5.
c. A code of ethics arguably reduces the number of lawsuits generally and
especially with respect to those lawyers who conscientiously follow the
rules. See Gerald P. Johnston, Avoiding Malpractice Liability in the Estate
Planning Context, 43 Major Tax Plan. §1700 (1991) and Martin D. Begleiter,
Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning-You've Got to Know When to Hold
Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 193 (1990).
d. It might sometimes seem as though these rules increase a lawyer's expo-
sure, but the Model Rules are not intended to do so. "Violation of a Rule
should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presump-
tion that a legal duty has been breached." ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, "Scope" §18 (1983).
e. "The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are
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not designed to be a basis for civil liability." ACTEC Commentaries,
Reporter's Note.
f. As a practical matter, however, a tax practitioner who violates a written
ethical standard may be a "sitting duck" in a malpractice or tort liability
lawsuit. Jackson M. Bruce Jr., Ethics in Estate Planning and Estate
Administration, 15 Probate Notes (ACPC) 118 (Fall 1989).
i. "Disappointed beneficiaries are increasingly positing their malprac-
tice claims on alleged violations of ethic code provisions...." Johnson,
Estate Planning Malpractice-Trap for the Unwary, ABA Tax Section, Estate &
Gift Tax Committee Meeting, May 16, 1992 ("Johnson"); see Larry W.
Gibbs, Avoiding Malpractice Suits: Some Sound Advice, 129 Tr. & Est. 12
(April 1990); Gerald P. Johnston, Avoiding Malpractice Liability in Estate
Planning, 43 Major Tax Plan. 1700 (1991).
ii. Other "sanctions" are possible as well. "...we hold that an attorney
who violates our rules of professional conduct... may receive neither
executor's nor legal fees for services he renders an estate." Estate of McCool,
553 A.2d 761, 769 (N.H. 1988).
iii. "A violation of an ethical rule may generate very serious adverse
results. First, the lawyer may be disciplined, which could range from a rep-
rimand to disbarment. Second, the same act may invalidate a document
prepared by the lawyer and executed by the client. Third, it may lead to a
malpractice action against the lawyer." Cairns and Price, Identfying and
Solving Ethical Issues In Your Estate Planning Practice: Recognizing Ethical
Problems Too Late Is Not Good Enough, Seattle Estate Planning Seminar,
Chapter 7, 1996.
4. The Rules don't fit estate planning perfectly.
a. Practitioners engaged in estate planning frequently have competing re-
sponsibilities, the specifics of which are not always clear.
i. The authors of one particular article described estate planners as fac-
ing a "three-pronged dilemma": "[Conflicting interests] create problems
for the lawyer who must meet his or her legal responsibilities to the client
by explaining all the alternatives and their potential outcomes, while also
meeting his or her ethical responsibility to avoid having the recommenda-
tions to one client affect the interests of another client, as well as satisfying
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the moral obligation of assisting the client in choosing the 'best' choice for
the client's particular situation." Louie N. Adcock and Laurie W. Valentine,
The Estate Planner's Dilemma: Reconciling Legal, Ethical and Moral Responsi-
bilities, 60 Fla. Bar J. 51 (Jan. 1986).
ii. The authors of a text designed primarily for tax lawyers talk about the
lawyer's obligation to "the system" ["an imprecise concept blending to-
gether notions of society, the profession, and the law"]: "Ordinarily, in per-
forming his duty to the client, the lawyer carries out his duty to the system
well. There are times, however, when the lawyer, while pursuing his
client's interests competently, loyally, and discreetly, must hold himself
and his client's interests in check in order to perform the less defined,
seemingly contradictory duty which he owes to the system as a whole."
Bernard Wolfman and James P. Holden, Ethical Problems in Federal Tax
Practice 1-2 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1995).
iii. But, another scholar defends a lawyer's freedom to represent a client
free from the "universalizing claims of morality": I will argue in this essay
that it is not only legally but also morally right that a lawyer adopt as his
or her dominant purpose the furthering of his client's interests-that it is
right that a professional put the interests of his client above some idea,
however valid, of the collective interest. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976).
b. For example, the condition of our client sometimes increases our chal-
lenge. A. Frank Johns, Fickett's Thicket: The Lawyer's Expanding Fiduciary and
Ethical Boundaries When Serving Older Americans of Moderate Wealth, 32
Wake Forest L. Rev. 445 (1997); David M. Rosenfeld, Whose Decision is it
Anyway?: Identifying the Medicaid Planning Client, 6 Elder L.J. 383 (1998);
Clifton B. Kruse, My Basement is Filled with Pornography, 12 NAELA
Quarterly 33 (Winter 1999).
c. Fortunately, "The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They
should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representa-
tion and of the law itself." Preamble to ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 13 (1983).
5. The goal is to avoid an ethical dilemma.
a. By thinking and talking about ethics now, in an academic setting, rather
than later, in the throws of an ethical dilemma, we empower ourselves to
avoid such situations entirely.
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i. "Anticipating and Avoiding Conflicts. This edition... continues to
emphasize the advantages to clients and lawyers of anticipating and
attempting to avoid potential problems ... .Estate planners not infrequent-
ly encounter difficult problems of professional responsibility, particularly
ones involving confidentiality and conflicts of interest. Serious problems
can often be reduced or eliminated by advance discussion and planning.
In particular, in any instances uncertainties regarding the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality can be eliminated with sufficient advance planning and
consent. Disclosure and agreement may also allow the same lawyer to rep-
resent the interests of multiple parties who have somewhat conflicting
interests, but not clients whose interests are seriously adverse, such as
adverse parties in litigation." ACTEC Commentaries, supra, at p. 410.
ii. "Accepting the admonition of the Commentaries to lawyers and their
clients to 'write their own charter with respect to a representation in the
trusts and estates field,' the Professional Standards Committee of
ACTEC.. .has been working diligently on the preparation of form engage-
ment letters reflecting recommended methods for representation of clients
in the estates and trusts area." Bruce S. Ross, I do, I don't & I won't: The Ethics
of Engagement Letters, 31 Inst. on Est. Plan. 8, p. 8-3 (1997).
b. See generally, Rothberg, Developments in the Practice and Ethics of Estate
Planning, 66 PLI/NY 251 (Dec. 1999); Haranzo, Ethical Considerations in
Estate Planning, 285 PLI/Est 195 (Nov. 1999); Andrea R. Macintosh, Ethical
Issues: Materials," SE30 ALI-ABA Course of Study: Creative Tax Planning
for Real Estate Transactions 547 (Oct. 7-9, 1999).
B. Specific Rules
1. The ABA has two sets of model standards of professional ethics in current
use among the various jurisdictions, the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code) and the Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). The
ABA does not enforce either. Lawyers' professional conduct is regulated
and enforced by states, which generally follow either the Model Code or
Model Rules.
a. The Model Code was adopted by the ABA in 1969 because of a perceived
need for change in the profession's ethical code. The original set of ethical
standards released by the ABA had been adopted in 1908 and contained
32 Canons of Ethics. These 32 canons had grown in number to 47 by the
early 1960s, but were still quite brief and considered inadequate. See
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Geoffrey C. Hazard and Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal Profession: Responsi-
bility and Regulation 99-100 (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988).
The Model Code reduced the number of canons to nine, but included
under each a set of Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. The
Model Code was eventually adopted by nearly every state in the union. Id.
at 100.
b. The content and structure of the Model Code came under much attack in
the years after its adoption. Also, events of the 1970s such as Watergate
and Supreme Court decisions on advertising and solicitation focused the
profession's and the public's attention on the professional ethics of
lawyers. Id. The ABA began another examination of its model ethical stan-
dards and in 1983 adopted the Model Rules.
c. The Model Rules follows a Rules and Commentary format similar to the
ALI Restatement of Laws rather than the more complicated system of
Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules employed by the
Model Code. The Model Rules are gaining increasing acceptance among
the states. Developments, supra, at 1.
d. The vast majority of the states have adopted the Model Rules with some
modification.
2. "[T]he Model Rules [,as well as the Model Code,] do not deal effectively with
some of the most important and most difficult problems of professional con-
duct in the practice of estate planning...." Developments, supra, at 1.
Developments is a report submitted by the ABA Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law's Committee on Significant New Developments in
Probate and Trust Law Practice.
a. Based on its examination of the Model Rules and a comparison of the
Model Rules with the Model Code, the committee has recommended that
a set of ethical standards be drawn up specifically for the areas of probate
and trust practice. Id. at 2.
i. The ABA Special Probate and Trust Division Study Committee on
Professional Responsibility has prepared The Lawyer's Duties in
Representing Husband and Wife, 1992 (hereafter "Representing Husband
and Wife"). It has been approved by both the Division Council and by the
Council of the Section as a whole. Although not an official interpretation
of the law governing legal ethics, it has been offered as a "prescriptive
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guide" to the "serious ethics issues estate planners routinely face." See gen-
erally, Malcom A. Moore and Anne K. Hilker, Representing Both Spouses: The
New Section Recommendations, 7 Prob. & Prop. 26 (July/Aug. 1993).
ii. The same group has also prepared Counseling the Fiduciary, 1993 and
Preparation of Wills and Trusts That Name Drafting Lawyer as Fiduciary, 1993.
The former encourages the use of written agreements that set forth the
duties of the lawyers and then provides guidance on the "default rules"
(i.e., the rules in the absence of an agreement to the contrary).
b. ACTEC has developed a set of commentaries that are intended to "fill the
gap" by providing particularized guidance to trust and estate attorneys
regarding their professional responsibilities. Copies of the most recent edi-
tion (3d ed. 1999) may be purchased for approximately $10 per copy from
ACTEC (3415 South Sepulveda Blvd. #460, Los Angeles, CA 90034.
Telephone (310) 398-1888; Fax (310) 572-7280).
3. Treasury Department Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1999), governs a profes-
sional's ability to represent clients before the IRS.
C. Application of Specific Rules
1. Relationships. Ethical standards specific to estate planning generally arise out
of relationships between the estate planner and other parties. The most exact-
ing of these standards result from the establishment of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. John R. Price, Professional Responsibility in Estate Planning: Progress or
Paralysis?, 21 Inst. on Est. Plan. 18-4 (1987).
a. "[T]he probate, trust and estate planning practitioner is frequently found
in a thicket of multiple representations where the conflicts between the
various parties' interests are subtle, pervasive, indirect, continuously shift-
ing and, in many instances, even difficult to recognize." Developments,
supra, at 2.
b. Although the term "client" is important in both the Model Code and the
Model Rules, it is defined in neither. The "scope" section of the Preamble
to the Model Rules states that "[w]hether a client-lawyer relationship
exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may
be a question of fact." See, Developments, supra, at 14-15.
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c. The attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature. As with contracts
generally, an express agreement is not necessary for formation. Rather,
agreement may be implied from the circumstances. Price, supra, at 18-4.
Indeed, the perceptions of the "client" may be given the most weight by a
court. See, e.g., Matter of McGlothlen, 663 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Wash. 1983). Otaka
v. Klein, 791 P.2d 713, 717 (Haw. 1990) ("Legal consultation occurs when the
client believes that he is approaching an attorney in a professional capaci-
ty with a manifest intent to seek professional legal advice. Thus the 'decid-
ing factor is what the prospective client thought.. .not what the lawyer
thought."); Butler v. State Bar of California, 721 P.2d 585, 589 (Cal. 1986).
2. General Duties. Estate planners may have a number of duties in common with
lawyers generally. Important among these are the duties of competence, dili-
gence, communication, and confidentiality.
a. Competence.
i. Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules states: "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation."
ii. DR 6-101 of the Model Code states: "A lawyer shall not: Handle a
legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to
handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to han-
dle it. Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances. Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
iii. The comment to Rule 1.1, above, states that "[i]n many instances, the
required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a partic-
ular field of law may be required in some circumstances." One is left to
guess whether estate planning is an area where expertise of some sort is
required. One court has indicated that a generalist who undertakes legal
work that should be referred to a specialist will be held to the same stan-
dard of care as the specialist. Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979). This standard-legal work that should be referred to a spe-
cialist-is not particularly helpful, especially in situations where the
lawyer accepts employment in an area in which he or she is not currently
qualified but expects to become qualified through study and investigation.
Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perilous Times
Ahead for the Practitioner, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 629,684 (1982). On the other hand,
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one practitioner has suggested that the actual standard will surprise many:
"While it may be assumed that the standard of care of a general practi-
tioner may be less than that of the legal specialist, it is not necessarily true
in practice. In my own observation, many times general practitioners who
adequately prepare in a given area perform even better services than some
who claim to be specialists. The general practitioner does not seem to suf-
fer the legal myopia of the specialist and sometimes perceives other effects
of a transaction or outcome more clearly." Carl E. Kasten, Attorney Mal-
practice in Illinois: An Early Chapter in a Book Destined for Great Length, 13
John Mar. L. Rev. 309, 316 n. 41 (1980).
iv. According to the ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.1: "The fact
that a lawyer does not precisely assess the tax or substantive law conse-
quences of a particular transaction does not necessarily reflect a lack of
competence. In some instances the facts are unclear or disputed, while in
others the state of the law is unsettled. In addition, some applications of
law and determinations of facts made by courts or administrative agencies
are not reasonably foreseeable. In other instances the complexity of a trans-
action or its unusual nature generate uncertainties regarding the manner
in which it will be treated for tax or substantive law purposes and may pre-
vent an otherwise thoroughly competent lawyer from accurately assessing
how the transaction would be treated for tax or substantive law purpos-
es." Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799 (Mass. 1996), is a malpractice action
alleging a failure to file a required tax return and otherwise to administer
an estate properly. Another malpractice action alleges that the decedent's
lawyer and CPA neglected to explain to her that taxes could have been
saved through use of a family limited partnership. Augustine v. Adams,
1997 WL 94263 (D. Kan. 1997). A lawyer was suspended for 30 days (later
stayed) for taking on an estate without sufficient skill and without associ-
ating with a more experienced lawyer. Lewis v. State Bar, 621 P.2d 258 (Cal.
1981). In Matter of D'Onofrio, 618 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (N.Y App. Div. 1994), a
lawyer was accused of numerous delays at various stages of an estate
administration, and ended up being censured and suffering a voluntary
fee reduction. See also Matter of Deardorff, 426 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. 1981) and
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Myers, 490 A.2d 231 (Md. 1985).
v. Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice 8.02 directs CPAs to "use
judgment to ensure that the advice given reflects professional competence
and appropriately serves the client's needs."
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b. Diligence.
i. Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules states: "A lawyer shall act with reason-
able diligence and promptness in representing a client."
ii. As noted above, DR 6-101(A)(3) of the Model Code states that a
lawyer shall not "[n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him." Diligence also
falls under Canon 7 of the Model Code which instructs that "[a] lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
iii. The comment to Rule 1.3, above, contains some statements applicable
to estate planners. The comment states that "[a] lawyer should pursue a
matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal
inconvenience to the lawyer." Also, the comment notes that "[plerhaps no
professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A
client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or
the change of conditions...." Most clearly, a client will be adversely affect-
ed if she dies before her lawyer completes her estate plan.
iv. The ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.3 suggest that the lawyer
and client establish a timetable for completion of various tasks. It also cau-
tions against "the imposition of time limits that may prevent the lawyer
from consulting fully with the client or giving a matter the time and atten-
tion it should receive. The lawyer should caution the client regarding the
risks that arise if a matter is pursued on an abbreviated time schedule that
deprives the lawyer of the opportunity fully to fulfill the lawyer's role...."
c. Communication.
i. Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules states: "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a mat-
ter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation."
ii. The duty of communication is fragmented in the Model Code. The
Model Code Comparison included in the Model Rules Comment to Rule
1.4 notes that DR 6-101(A)(3), providing that a lawyer shall not "[n]eglect
a legal matter entrusted to him," DR 9-102(B)(1), providing that a lawyer
shall "[p]romptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or
other properties," EC 7-8, providing that a lawyer "should exert his best
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efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client
has been informed of relevant considerations," and EC 9-2, providing that
"a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material devel-
opments in the matters being handled for the client," are all relevant. "The
lawyer's duty to communicate with a client during the active period of the
representation includes the duty to inform the client reasonably regarding
the law; developments that affect the client; and the progress of the repre-
sentation. "The lawyer for an estate planning client should attempt to
inform a client to the extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to
make informed judgments regarding major issues involved in the repre-
sentation." ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.4.
iii. "The execution of estate planning documents and the completion of
related matters, such as changes in beneficiary designations and the trans-
fer of assets to the trustee of a trust, normally ends the period during
which the estate planning lawyer actively represents an estate planning
client. At that time, unless the representation is terminated by the lawyer
or client, the representation becomes dormant, awaiting activation by the
client." ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.4."Although the lawyer
remains bound to the client by some obligations, including the duty of
confidentiality, the lawyer's responsibilities are diminished by the com-
pletion of the active phase of the representation. As a service the lawyer
may communicate periodically with the client regarding the desirability of
reviewing his or her estate planning documents. Similarly, the lawyer may
send the client an individual letter or a form letter, pamphlet, or brochure
regarding changes in the law that might affect the client. In the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, the lawyer is not obligated to send a
reminder to a client whose representation is dormant or to advise the client
of the effect that changes in the law or the client's circumstances might
have on the client's legal affairs." ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.4.
The comment to Rule 1.4 notes that a problem may arise when the client
is a child or suffers from mental disability. In such a case, communication
might have to be different in form than communication with competent
adults, or it might have to be with a guardian instead of the client directly.
vi. One issue left open is whether a lawyer for a fiduciary of an estate or
trust may or must communicate directly with beneficiaries of that estate or
trust. See, Developments, supra, at 5.
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vii. Rule 1.14 provides that when a client's ability to make adequately
considered decisions is impaired, whether because of minority, mental dis-
ability or otherwise, the lawyer should maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship as far as reasonably possible, and should seek a guardian or
other protection for the client only if necessary. If a minor or disabled client
has no guardian, his or her lawyer may be under an obligation to act as de
facto guardian. Comment to Rule 1.14.
viii. Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice 8.02 absolves CPAs of
any responsibility of following a "standard format or guidelines in com-
municating written or oral advice," and 8.04 is equally generous in its con-
clusion that "the CPA cannot be expected to have assumed responsibility
for initiating communication [when subsequent developments affect
advice previously provided] except while assisting a client in implement-
ing procedures or plans associated with the advice provided or when the
CPA undertakes this obligation by specific agreement with the client." One
wonders if plaintiffs' lawyers are equally generous in their thinking.
d. Confidentiality.
i. Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules states: "(a) A lawyer shall not reveal infor-
mation relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b). (b)
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary: to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any pro-
ceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client."
ii. DR 4-101 of the Model Code protects information that falls under the
attorney-client privilege, referred to as "confidences," and information
"gained in the professional relationship" that the client asked to be kept
secret or the disclosure of which would cause the client embarrassment or
other harm, referred to as "secrets." The disciplinary rule prohibits law-
yers from revealing confidences or secrets of their clients, from using such
confidences or secrets to their clients' disadvantage, and from using such
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confidences or secrets to the lawyer's own or a third party's advantage
without consent of the client after full disclosure. The disciplinary rule
does allow the revelation of confidences or secrets (1) with the consent of
the client after full disclosure, (2) where permitted by the Model Code or
required by law or court order, and (3) where necessary to collect the
lawyer's fee, or defend against accusations of wrongful conduct. Also, a
lawyer may reveal his or her client's intention to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.
iii. AICPA Rule 301 prohibits a member from disclosing any confidential
client information without the specific consent of the client.
iv. Perhaps the most difficult confidentiality problems for the estate
planner, and those most unique to the estate planning area of practice,
arise as a result of multiparty representation. Multiparty representation is
very common in estate planning since clients often desire or request it for
cost or other reasons. Developments, supra, at 18. The potential for conflicts
in multiparty representation, however, is tremendous. These conflicts can
lead to confidentiality problems. For example, if a lawyer is assisting a
couple with their estate plan, one spouse might relay some information to
the lawyer that he or she would like to keep secret from such other spouse,
but which is material to the estate plan. Since the information is material
to the estate plan, it is in the other spouse's best interest to know the infor-
mation. Such situations should be avoided or representation of both
spouses may have to be withdrawn. "When the lawyer is first consulted
by the multiple potential clients the lawyer should review with them the
terms upon which the lawyer will undertake the representation, including
the extent to which information will be shared among them. The principal
terms should, but need not be, reflected in a writing a copy of which is
given to each client." ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.6."Unless
otherwise agreed, a lawyer who represents multiple clients with regard to
related legal matters is presumed to represent them jointly. Such a repre-
sentation usually implies that information will be shared by the clients
with respect to the subject of the representation but confidentiality will be
maintained as to all others." ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.6.
"There does not appear to be any authority that expressly authorizes a
lawyer to represent multiple clients separately with respect to related legal
matters. However, with full disclosure and the consent of the clients some
experienced estate planners regularly undertake to represent husbands
and wives as separate clients. Similarly, but with less frequency, some
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estate planners also represent a parent and child or other multiple clients
as separate clients. A lawyer who is asked to provide separate representa-
tion to multiple clients should do so with great care because of the stress it
necessarily places on the lawyer's duties of impartiality and loyalty and
the extent to which it may limit the lawyer's ability to advise each of the
clients adequately." ACTEC Commentary on Rule 1.6. "[T]he lawyer and
the fiduciary may agree between themselves that the lawyer may disclose
to the beneficiaries or to an appropriate court action or inaction on the part
of the fiduciary that might constitute a breach of trust. Whether or not the
lawyer and fiduciary enter into such an agreement, the lawyer for the
fiduciary ordinarily owes some duties largely restrictive in nature to the
beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate." "The existence of those duties alone
may qualify the lawyer's duty of confidentiality with respect to the fidu-
ciary." "In addition, the lawyer's duties to the court may require the
lawyer for a court-appointed fiduciary to disclose to the court any acts of
misconduct committed by the fiduciary." ACTEC Commentary on Model
Rule 1.6. See generally, Patricia M. Bait, The Family Unit as Client: A Means to
Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Elder Law Attorneys, 6 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 319 (1992).
3. Conflicts.
a. The bulk of the ethics issues in the estate planning area arises from con-
flicts of interest. These conflicts can be roughly broken down into two
classes-those between clients where there is multiparty representation
and those between the lawyer and the client.
b. Generally.
i. Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents
after consultation. A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the rep-
resentation will not be adversely affected; and the client consents after consultation.
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
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ii. The American Law Institute Restatement Third, The Law Governing
Lawyers, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (1996) ("Restatement") takes a similar
approach:
§201. Basic Prohibition of Conflict of Interest. Unless all affected clients and other neces-
sary persons consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions provid-
ed in section 202, a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation would involve
a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the
lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the
lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, to a former
client, or to a third person.
§202. Client Consent to a Conflict of Interest. (1) A lawyer may represent a client notwith-
standing a conflict of interest prohibited by §201 if each affected client or former client
gives informed consent to the lawyer's representation. Informed consent requires that the
client or former client have reasonably adequate information about the risks and advan-
tages of such representation to that client.
(2) Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former client, a
lawyer may not represent a client if:
(a) the representation is prohibited by law;
(b) one client will assert a claim against the other in some litigation; or
(c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide
adequate representation to one or more of the clients.
iii. The Model Code contains similar provisions. DR 5-105(A) prohibits a
lawyer from accepting employment "if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adverse-
ly affected by the acceptance... or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-
105(C)." DR 5-105(C) provides that "a lawyer may represent multiple
clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each
and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possi-
ble effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of each." DR 5-101(A) prohibits a lawyer from
accepting employment when his judgment "reasonably may be affected
by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests."
iv. ET §102 requires that CPAs "maintain objectivity and integrity" and
that they remain "free of conflicts of interests." (1) Interpretation 102-2
explains that "a conflict of interest may occur if a member performs a pro-
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fessional service for a client or employer and the member or his or her firm
has a relationship with another person, entity, product, or service that
could, in the member's professional judgment, be viewed by the client,
employer, or other appropriate parties as impairing the member's objec-
tivity." (2) Like lawyers, CPAs who believe their services can be performed
with objectivity generally may proceed once the relationship has been dis-
closed to, and consent obtained from, the appropriate parties. (3)
Examples of situations that should cause a member to consider whether a
conflict exists include: (a) providing tax or personal financial planning ser-
vices for several members of a family who may have opposing interests.
(b) referring clients to other service providers who refer clients to the mem-
ber under an exclusive arrangement to do so. (4) "Full disclosure [by
CPAs] involves a recitation of all pertinent facts, advice as to the actual and
potential conflicts and their implications, and a discussion of the risks
involved." Koplin, Koplin and Gabrielson, "Ethical Issues Facing CPAs
Involved in Estate Planning and Administration," 20th Annual AICPA
Advanced Estate Planning Conference (1997).
c. Conflicts between clients.
i. Husband/Wfe. It is common for an attorney to be approached by one
spouse about doing an estate plan for both spouses. In such cases, the
lawyer's contact will often be primarily with the spouse that first contact-
ed him or her. If the lawyer is preparing wills or an estate plan for both,
however, both are the lawyer's clients and both need to be treated as such.
Developments, supra, at 10-11. There is a wide range of conflicts that can
arise when a lawyer prepares an estate plan for spouses. "Many lawyers
believe the better practice-though not itself required by the Model Rules
[or Code]-is a written agreement.. .setting forth the ground rules of the
representation at the outset." Hilker, supra at 9. In the Developments article,
supra, the authors provide a list of situations that flag potential conflicts: (1)
Children by another marriage may lead to problems because the natural
parent of the children will often have a stronger desire to provide for them
than his or her spouse. (2) In community property states, determination of
the status of property as community or separate is potentially divisive
because of the differing rights such legal statuses provide. (3) In commu-
nity property states, the forced election whereby one spouse must forego
his or her interest in the community property or else lose his or her right
to take under the will is a naturally conflicting situation likely requiring
full, impartial explanation to the electing spouse. Elective rights in non-
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community property states may cause a similar situation. (4) Dispositions
in trust, whereby the receiving spouse's rights in the property are limited
to a degree, may give rise to conflicts. This is particularly so with the QTIP
Trust since, if no interest in the principal is given to the surviving spouse,
benefits from such a trust flow only to the first spouse to die. (5) The choice
of a trustee for the trusts set up for the surviving spouse's benefit may
cause conflict. (6) Disinheritance as an estate planning technique can cause
conflict. (7) Even when the initial estate plan goes smoothly, problems may
arise in the future when one or the other spouse seeks to make a change in
the plan. (8) Drafting of pre- or post-nuptial agreements is an inherently
adversarial exercise. In California, simply the fact that a surviving spouse
was not represented by independent counsel at the time an agreement
waiving marital rights was signed may be enough to nullify the agree-
ment. Cal. Prob. Code §146(e).
ii. Other potentially divisive estate planning options are: selection of
retirement plan options, gift-giving programs, and transfers of life insur-
ance. Price, supra, at 18-11 to 18-12; James R. Wade, When Can a Lawyer
Represent Both Husband and Wife in Estate Planning? Probate & Property,
March-April 1987; Mercer D. Tate, Handling Conflicts of Interest That May
Occur in an Estate Planning Practice, 16 Est. Planning, pp. 32-37 (January-
February 1989); Joseph C. Obegi, Handling Conflict of Interest Problems in
Estate Planning, 13 Community Prop. J. 46 (Jan. 1987).
iii. Parent/Child. Conflicts between parents and children can arise in three
ways: parents may overreach when engaging in estate planning involving
a young or youthful child of theirs, children may overreach when engag-
ing in estate planning involving an aged or infirm parent, or conflicts may
arise even where both parties are competent adults. See, Price, supra, at 18-
16, 18-17. Cases where parents have been found to overreach minor or
youthful children often involve trusts or custodial funds. A parent may
attempt to unduly restrict a child's access to funds, or may abuse his or her
position as trustee or custodian by expending the child's funds for the par-
ent's benefit. In such cases, if the child was not independently represent-
ed, the trust might be set aside. Price, supra, at 18-16, citing Erdmann v.
Erdmann, 226 N.W.2d 439 (Wis. 1975) and Jiminez v. Lee, 547 P.2d 126 (Or.
1976). When aged or infirm parents are involved, the claim will generally
be one of undue influence or fraud. If an aged parent is a client in an indi-
vidual or family estate plan, the lawyer must discuss the plan with the
parent independently, being held to the duty of loyalty that arises out of
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Rule 1.7 or DR 5-105. Price, supra, at 18-17. In one well known case, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that representation of both child bene-
ficiary and parent raised a presumption of undue influence "because the
testator's attorney has placed himself in a conflict of interest and profes-
sional loyalty between the testator and beneficiary." Haynes v. First National
State Bank of New Jersey, 87 N.J. 163, 432 A.2d 890, 900 (N.J. 1981). When
representation is simply multigenerational, with no incompetent parties,
conflicts might still arise. The problems of restricted control of trust prop-
erty, gift programs, and disinheritance, for instance, all are concerns of
multigenerational planning. Additionally, business transactions necessary
to an estate plan may cause problems because of their inherently adver-
sarial nature, and a family business entity may be yet another possible
client whose interests must be considered. Price, supra, at 18-17; and
Developments, supra, at 13.
iv. Fiduciary/Beneficiary. Representation of both a fiduciary and a corre-
sponding beneficiary is problematic because of a fiduciary's duty to treat
all beneficiaries impartially and to exercise discretion independent of the
wishes of the beneficiaries. Price, supra, at 18-15. When an attorney repre-
sents just the fiduciary, however, he or she should make the beneficiaries
aware that the scope of his or her duties does not include watching out for
their individual interests, and that they need to secure independent coun-
sel for this purpose. Failure to so inform them that they are responsible for
protecting their interests may amount to malpractice. Id., citing Linck v.
Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1983). Generally, acting as counsel
or advisor to a fiduciary may result in a lawyer's owing fiduciary duties
to the beneficiaries as well. Price, supra, 18-7, citing Morales v. Field, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (trust); Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051 (Wash.
1985) (estate); Comment to Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules (guardianships
and conservatorships). Conventional wisdom and case law seem to view
the fiduciary as the sole client. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Frye, 2D Cal. App. 3d
1258 (1990); Michigan Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. R-10 (April 19,1991). See,
e.g., Malcom A. Moore, Conflicting Interests in Postmortem Planning, 9 Inst.
on Est. Plan §1900 (1975); Malcolm A. Moore, Conflicts in Post-Mortem
Estate Planning After the Tax Reform Act, 12 U. Miami Inst. Est. Plan. §105
(1978). But there seems to be growing support for the notion that deriva-
tive duties are owed to the beneficiaries. See generally, Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 Georgetown J. of
Legal Ethics 15 (1987); Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051 (Wash. 1985). See also,
Ethics Panel, Who is the Client When You Represent the Fiduciary, paper pre-
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sented at the fall meeting of the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel, October 9, 1992. Professor Pennell champions an entity approach
whereby the lawyer must protect the interests of the beneficiaries as well
as the fiduciary. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving
Fiduciary Entities: Who is the Client, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1319 (1994); N.Y. St.
Ethics Op. No. 512 (1979).The ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.2
distinguishes between representation in a "representative" capacity and
"individual" representation: "If a lawyer is retained to represent a fiducia-
ry generally with respect to the fiduciary estate, the lawyer represents the
fiduciary in a representative and not an individual capacity-the ultimate
objective of which is to administer the fiduciary estate for the benefit of the
beneficiaries. Giving recognition to the representative capacity in which
the lawyer represents the fiduciary is appropriate because in such cases
the lawyer is retained to perform services that benefit the fiduciary estate
and, derivatively, the beneficiaries-not to perform services that benefit
the fiduciary individually. The nature of the relationship is also suggested
by the fact that the fiduciary and the lawyer for the fiduciary are both com-
pensated from the fiduciary estate." "A lawyer represents the fiduciary
generally (i.e., in a representative capacity) when the lawyer is retained to
advise the fiduciary regarding the administration of the fiduciary estate or
matters affecting the estate. On the other hand, a lawyer represents a fidu-
ciary individually when the lawyer is retained for the limited purpose of
advancing the interests of the fiduciary and not necessarily the interests of
the fiduciary estate or the persons beneficially interested in the estate."
Arguably, this can and should be worked out and documented at the out-
set. "The nature and extent of the lawyer's duties to the beneficiaries of the
fiduciary estate may vary according to the circumstances, including the
nature and extent of the representation and the terms of any understand-
ing or agreement among the parties (the lawyer, the fiduciary, and the ben-
eficiaries)." ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.2.ABA Formal Opinion
94-380 says "the lawyer's obligation to preserve the client's confidences
under Rule 1.6 is not altered by the circumstance that the client is a fidu-
ciary." This seems to be the case in the large majority of states. See, e.g.,
Morgan and Rotunda, 1996 Selected Standards on Professional Responsibil-
ity 132-140. But some states permit disclosure and three (Georgia, Hawaii,
and Ohio) require it. Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules provides that a lawyer
may not represent a client in a matter where that client's interests are
adverse to the interests of one of the lawyer's former clients in the same or
similar matter. Also, a lawyer may not use information from a former rep-
resentation to the disadvantage of a the former client. The duty of confi-
Ethical Problems 53
dentiality clearly extends past the termination of the former representa-
tion. Comment to Rule 1.6, above. This is consistent with the general duty
of loyalty required of lawyers to their clients. Possible issues here are
whether a lawyer can represent a surviving spouse in changing or
renouncing an estate plan the lawyer had previously drafted for both
spouses, and whether a lawyer who has drafted an estate plan for both
spouses may later represent one spouse in a divorce proceeding.
Developments, supra, at 20. Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules and DR 5-107(A)(1)
prohibits lawyers from accepting compensation from other parties for rep-
resentation of a client unless the client consents after consultation; Rule 1.8
explicitly adds the requirements of no interference with the lawyer's inde-
pendent judgment or the attorney-client relationship, and no breach of
confidentiality. The potential for improper interference in the attorney-
client relationship by someone paying the tab is obvious. Many conflicts,
particularly arising from multiparty representation, are based at least in
part on how we view the role of the lawyer. The Model Rules take note of
the fact that the role of the lawyer often goes beyond or differs from the
standard paradigm of lawyer-as-advocate. Rule 2.1 provides that lawyers
may advise their clients, and in doing so may take into consideration rele-
vant moral, economic, social, and political factors. Rule 2.2 provides that a
lawyer may act as an intermediary between clients if the clients consent
after being fully informed as to the risks and advantages of such a method
of proceeding and its effect on the relationships between the parties. The
rule requires that the lawyer reasonably believe that such a method of pro-
ceeding will be workable and to the clients' advantage. If problems arise,
the lawyer is required to withdraw as intermediary and is prohibited from
representing either party in the same matter.
d. Conflicts between attorney and client.
i. Fees. Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules provides that a lawyer's fee shall be
reasonable, giving some factors helpful in that determination, and that the
fee should be communicated to the client, preferably in writing. The Rule
also gives some instructions regarding contingent fees and the division of
fees between lawyers not in the same firm. The Model Code prohibits
"clearly excessive" fees, DR 2-106(A), and also gives some instructions on
contingent fees and fee division, DR 2-106(C) and DR 2-107(A). These
rules, however, do not directly deal with most of the fee-related issues con-
fronting the estate planner. Three of these issues are "loss leaders," tax
treatment, and the cost/product tradeoff. Also an issue for estate planners
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is dual fees for dual representation. "Loss leaders" refers to a practice of
estate planning lawyers that was common in the past, i.e., underbilling
"front end" legal work with the expectation of being selected to do the
more lucrative estate legal work at a later date and possibly recouping any
prior losses at that point. Clearly, when there is fee manipulation of any
sort, it should be closely examined. An argument can be made that the
overall fee is reasonable even if there is some attempt to recoup earlier
losses, and that "loss leader" billing technique is not misleading since it is
commonplace. Opponents of "loss leaders," on the other hand, claim that
the lower front end fee may lead to lower quality estate planning, that it
misleads the client about the attorney's normal fees, and that recoupment
is tempting and simply unethical. Developments, supra, at 5, citing A. James
Casner, Estate Planning Statesmanship, 8 U. Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. 12-8
(1974). Another issue that arises in billing for estate planning services is the
client's tax treatment of such charges. Section 212(3) deduction allowed for
expenses incurred in connection with tax determination, collection, or
refund makes it tempting to seek to write off a large portion of estate plan-
ning services when in fact only that portion qualifying as tax planning is
deductible. Developments, supra, at 5; Treas. Reg. §1.212-1(a)(1). Also, estate
planners are sometimes asked to include estate planning services for cor-
porate officers in with the general corporate billings, a practice that may
inflate corporate business expenses with ones personal in nature. Develop-
ments, supra, at 5-6, citing A. James Casner, supra, at 12-9. A third issue aris-
ing in the fee area of estate planning is the propriety of offering the client
short-term savings on estate planning by preparation of a simple will or
other unsophisticated plan that does not make use of revocable living
trusts and other probate avoidance devices that may save the client money
in the long run. Developments, supra, at 6. A final issue is the propriety of
charging dual fees when an attorney serves as both fiduciary and attorney.
Courts have tended to reduce the attorney's fee in such circumstances,
likely reflecting a perception by the court of overlapping duties. The
requirement of "reasonable" fees should actually take care of this issue.
ii. Attorney as beneficiary. Rule 1.8(c) of the Model Rules states: "A lawyer
shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to
the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a
client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to
the donee." The Model Code addresses this topic in EC 5-5, prohibiting a
lawyer from "suggest[ing] to his client that a gift be made to himself or for
his benefit." The Model Rules clearly has more teeth here since they set
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forth an almost per se rule (with the exception of the qualifier "substan-
tial") and so eliminates the need to show undue influence, which may be
difficult even though a drafter/beneficiary situation is likely to attract
close scrutiny. See, Leonard Levin, Legal Ramifications of Unethical Estate
Planning Practices, 124 Tr. & Est. 47,47-48 (Oct. 1985); Johnston, supra, at 60-
86. One possible issue still open, however, is indirect bequests to a draft-
ing attorney, such as gifts to the attorney's favorite charity. Price, supra, at
18-18. In such a case, the disclosure of conflicts requirements in Rule 1.7
and DR 5-101(A) might apply. Developments, supra, at 24.
iii. Attorney as fiduciary. The lawyer drafting a will or trust has some
motivation to have him or herself named as executor or trustee of the
estate since there are often substantial fees to be earned from such service,
and the fees are paid out of estate funds. Thus, there is potential for attor-
neys overreaching here. The Model Rules does not explicitly address this
problem, though Rule 1.7, on conflicts, Rule 1.8(a), on business transac-
tions with the client, and Rules 7.1-7.3, on advertising and solicitation, are
relevant. EC 5-6 of the Model Code, on the other hand, provides specifi-
cally that "[a] lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name
him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument." In either case, there
is no proscription of the drafting lawyer serving as fiduciary of the estate;
the focus instead is on how that appointment comes about. Also relevant
are the problems of multiparty representation and, if the lawyer appoints
him or herself as counsel to the estate or trust as well, which he or she will
have the power to do as executor, dual fees, which are both discussed
below. See, William D. Haught, Task Force Continues Study on Attorneys in
Fiduciary Roles, 128 Tr. & Est. 14 (April 1989) and William D. Haught,
Attorneys Take Fiduciary Roles, 127 Tr. & Est. 10 (Feb. 1988), Patricia
Brosterhous, Draft Statement on Principles on Attorneys Acting as Other
Fiduciaries, 127 Tr. & Est. 12 (December 1988); Mercer D. Tate, Handling
Conflicts of Interest That May Occur in an Estate Planning Practice, 16 Est.
Plan. 32, 36 (1989); Developments, supra, at 24; Levin, supra, at 49-50; Price,
supra, at 18-19; and Johnston, supra, at 86-101. In State v. Gulbankian, 196
N.W.2d 733 (Wis. 1972), the practice of a lawyer being named a fiduciary
in numerous cases, based on the sheer numbers, was found to be unethi-
cal. "Where client requests that you serve as fiduciary, make a record of the
reasons for the nomination and the discussions of the amount of commis-
sions (or multiple commissions) and whether there would also be a legal
fee." Wood, Carew & Hyde, Selection of Fiduciaries and the Role of the Attorn-
ey Draftsperson, Ethical Obligations, Administrative Powers, Simultaneous
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Death and Tax Apportionment, 282 PLI/Est. 211 (Sept. 1999). "Prepare and
review with the client [a] disclosure form...." Id. at 218. Although an attor-
ney or any other person may serve as a fiduciary, courts scrutinize wills
nominating the attorney who drafted the will ("attorney/draftsperson")
as fiduciaries. The leading case in this area is Matter of Weinstock, 351
N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1976) where the Court of Appeals held that overreaching
by the attorneys/draftsmen (a father-son team who were both named as
Executors for a new 82-year old client) could result in the denial of letters
by the Surrogate in the probate proceedings. See also, Charles. J. Groppe,
The "New" Putnam Rule: Problems Facing the Attorne-Legatee-Fiduciary, 61
N.YS. Bar Journal 18 (Jan. 1989); Matter of Stalbe, 497 N.YS.2d 237 (N.Y Sur.
Ct. 1985)." Ethical Considerations in Ethical Planning, 63 PLI/NY 195 (Nov.
1999). Objections to the nomination can be made right up to the final
accounting. Matter of Thron, 530 N.YS.2d 951 (N.Y Sur. Ct. 1988); Matter of
Laflin, 491 N.YS.2d 35 (N.Y App. Div. 1985); Matter of Harris, 473 N.YS.2d
125 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1984); Matter of Klenk, 574 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y Sur. Ct. 1991)
aff'd 612 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y App. Div. 1994).
iv. The drafter also has some motivation to try to secure appointment as
lawyer for the fiduciary, again because of the fees generated by the service
provided, such fees again being paid out of the estate or trust. One route
to appointment as attorney for the estate is explicit designation in the
instrument itself. Generally, the designation of the lawyer in the instru-
ment is not binding on the fiduciary. Price, supra, at 18-20. Nevertheless, it
raises questions of overreaching and solicitation. See, Developments, supra,
at 26; Levin, supra, at 50, 53; and Johnston, supra, at 101-12. It has been sug-
gested that because such a clause is unlikely to be requested or challenged
by the client, its insertion is a very subtle sort of solicitation and so may be
even more deplorable than naming oneself as fiduciary. Developments,
supra, at 26, citing Johnston, supra, at 103. Corporate fiduciary's policy of
naming draftsman as estate attorney. Another route to the estate attorney
appointment is through appointment by the corporate fiduciary named in
the instrument. At one time corporate fiduciaries had explicit agreements
with bar associations to name the drafter of the instrument as estate attor-
ney. Although there are no longer such agreements, since they are subject
to anti-trust challenges, the pattern of appointment in many jurisdictions
suggests there is at least an informal policy calling for such appointment.
Levin, supra, at 50, 53. Since this is simply an indirect method to accom-
plish the same result as naming oneself estate attorney in the instrument,
see above, the same concerns apply. Also, there is a concern that the
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lawyer's judgment as to who would be the best fiduciary for his or her
particular client may be affected. See, Developments, supra, at 26-27;
Leonard Levin, supra, at 50, 53; and Johnston, supra, at 115-20. Wisconsin
has addressed this by adopting a statute giving beneficiaries 30 days fol-
lowing the appointment of a corporate fiduciary to name an estate attor-
ney, if none was named in the will. Wis. Stat. Ann. §856.31. Developments,
supra, at 27. Safekeeping of clients' wills has in the past been used as a
method of securing appointment as estate attorney, the reasoning being
that the beneficiaries or fiduciary will have to come to the lawyer to get the
will, and so will be more inclined to hire that lawyer because of that con-
tact. This is clearly a subtle form of solicitation. However, safekeeping of a
client's will can also be a valuable service to the client. Again, the propri-
ety of the practice will depend on the circumstances. See, Developments,
supra, at 28; Johnston, supra, at 124-33.
e. Avoidance, mitigation, withdrawal.
i. When conflicts or other problems arise or are likely to arise, the estate
planner has basically three methods of proceeding: avoidance, mitigation,
or withdrawal. Price, supra, at 18-9. If the lawyer is able to spot the poten-
tial for problems ahead of time, he or she can arrange the relationship with
the client or client in such a way as to avoid conflicts. Most clearly, the
lawyer can simply insist that parties need to have independent represen-
tation. Another option is for the lawyer to make clear that he or she is serv-
ing as an intermediary per Rule 2.2, above. Or, the lawyer may inform the
clients ahead of time of the risks of multiple-party representation, and
make clear that he or she must not be the keeper of any intraclient secrets,
otherwise independent representation will be necessary.
ii. Once a conflict has arisen, if the conflict is not of a serious enough
nature to require independent representation, the lawyer may, per Rule
1.7, mitigate the problem by obtaining the client's consent to proceed after
full disclosure to the client of the conflict and any possible risk or risks
involved in proceeding. The tough call here, of course, is whether the con-
flict is so serious as to require independent representation.
iii. If the conflict is indeed too serious to allow the attorney-client rela-
tionship to proceed, withdrawal is required, per Rule 1.16 or DR 2-110.
Rule 1.16 and DR 2-110 provide that a lawyer shall withdraw from repre-
sentation in certain circumstances, the most applicable here being where
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failure to do so would result in the violation of the Model Rules or the
Model Code, respectively. If a lawyer was acting as an intermediary, he or
she must withdraw from representation of all parties. If the lawyer was
not acting in that special role, however, he or she need only withdraw from
representation of enough parties to remove the conflict. Developments,
supra, at 21, 22.
APPENDIX
20 Ways To Enhance Your Chances of Getting Sued for
MALPRACTICE*
I. Skip talks and articles on ethics-it all boils down to "the golden rule," doesn't
it?
1I. When pointy headed academics talk about potential problems, just tell your-
self "if it was really a problem, someone would have told me about it before now."
III. Don't bother detailing the scope of your engagement in an engagement (or
nonengagement) letter. After all, you know who your clients are and what you've
agreed to do (or not do).
IV. Don't let it bug you if someone's file has been on your desk for quite some
time (especially if the ball is in their court). If they aren't in a hurry why should
you be?
V. Don't bother talking to a client about a theoretical option if you already know
what he or she would eventually decide. After all, you're the expert.
VI. To heck with specialists. How hard can it be?
VII. Refer your clients to people who will scratch your back in return. And keep
it simple-provide just one name.
VIII. Don't be a stickler for details and never double-check information provided
by your client.
* This list is intended to stimulate a discussion and not to pinpoint behavior that
is below existing standards or otherwise deficient in some way.
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IX. Leave important details to the client's other advisors and just assume they are
doing a good job.
X. Forget about unnecessary paperwork-don't document oral communications
and always toss your research notes.
XI. Pay no attention to state lines.
XII. Never tell clients that they are now former clients.
XIII. Summarize the effect of a complicated strategy in a simple letter to the client,
and don't mention that it could be misleading.
XIV. Rely on a third party's description of what the client wants.
XV. Never explain the obvious.
XVI. Encourage your clients to make generous gifts to worthwhile charities; and,
be generous with your time in serving on the boards of those same charities.
XVII. Make sure you are using every new idea being talked about at tax semi-
nars, and don't mention that they are untested.
XVIII. Don't confuse (or worse yet, alienate) your married-couple clients by talk-
ing about possible conflicts of interest and stuff like that.
XIX. If your client wants you to serve as a trustee or personal representative, say
yes quickly, but be sure to slip exculpatory language into the document(s).
XX. Make sure that your clients realize that you are smarter and more important
than them.

